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INTRODUCTION
The Author was rather tickled (no pun intended), by a story out of
the United Kingdom concerning the confluence of two seemingly
unrelated products—a vibrating toothbrush and plastic sex-toy shaped
1
like a bunny. The plastic bunny was designed specifically to work with
a vibrating toothbrush, turning it into a vibrating bunny-shaped sex-toy.
2
Some might regard this as a clever convergence of technologies. Yet, a
manufacturer of vibrating toothbrushes opposed the use of its products
3
in association with the advertisements for the bunny. The toothbrush
manufacturer claimed that such use could be misleading to the public

* Visiting Assistant Professor at Wayne State University Law School, Detroit, Michigan. The
author would like to thank the Marquette IP Law Review, and in particular Melissa Benko,
Tiffany Beaty, and Kevin Rizzuto for their expertise and patience.
1. See
LoveHoney,
Sex
Toy
Blog,
http://www.lovehoney.co.uk/sextoys/blog/2007/06/11/proctor-and-gamble-gives-toothbush-sex-toys-the-brush-off/ (June 11,
2007, 09:06).
2. See Money.cnn.com, 101 Dumbest Moments in Business, available at
http://money.cnn.com/galleries/2007/fortune/0712/gallery.101_dumbest.fortune/33.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2009); infra text accompanying note 96.
3. See LoveHoney, supra note 1. Procter & Gamble asserted, “Our client’s trade
marks should not be used to promote and sell third party products nor indeed should they be
promoted by third parties for any purpose other than that for which they were intended.” Id.
On LoveHoney’s website, the “Brush Bunny” Electric Toothbrush Rabbit Vibrator (aka the
“Tingle Tip”) had been pictured next to a Braun® Oral-B® electric toothbrush. Id. The
website also described the Brush Bunny as fitting on to an Oral-B electric toothbrush. Id.
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4

and potentially injurious. The manufacturer of the bunny, on the other
5
hand, claimed that it was simply telling the truth about its products.
The vibrating bunny sex-toy is certainly not the first product to ride
the coat-tails of another product, or even to depend on another product
for its very utility. Many businesses offer products or services that
complement the products or services of another business. For example,
Apple’s iPod line of digital music players spawned speakers,
headphones, and carrying cases, all specifically designed to fit the shape
6
and functionality of the iPod device. And many repair shops specialize
7
in repairing specific brands of goods within a more general class. These
businesses need to communicate the complementary relationship
between the original, underlying product and their own goods or
services, and sometimes there is simply no other practical way to
8
communicate this relationship than to refer to the trademark
representing that original product. For example, a car mechanic who
specializes in repairing “Volkswagen” vehicles must necessarily refer to
9
the Volkswagen trademark. It would be an exercise in futility for the
mechanic to attempt to describe his services without referring to the
10
trademark. Thus, in what has come to be known as “nominative fair
use,” one business may use the plain-text version of another’s
trademark when necessary to identify the trademark owner’s goods and

4. See id. Procter & Gamble claimed, “Improper use of the trade marks BRAUN and
Oral B in this manner is misleading to the public and could potentially result in injury.” Id.
(emphasis omitted).
5. See id. LoveHoney stated, “We’re not suggesting that Oral B endorses the Tingle
Tip (we wish!), but it’s a statement of fact that the Tingle Tip does indeed fit directly on to
your Oral B toothbrush, or any other electric toothbrush for that matter.” Id.
6. See iStore.com, which specializes in accessories for all of the iPod devices. iStore,
http://www.theistore.com/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). See also David Zalubowski, Couple
make $10 million on Crocs craze, MSNBC, Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
15121346/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2009) (Jibbitz, a small company, made accessories specifically
designed and marketed for the holes in Crocs brand shoes. Crocs Inc. later purchased the
Jibbitz company and endorsed the Jibbitz accessories.).
7. For example, see A & S Services, which specializes in the repair of Rolex watches.
A & S Services, http://www.as-services.com/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2009). See also
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1969).
8. See infra note 18. Trademarks identify and distinguish goods; service marks identify
and distinguish services.
9. See Volkswagenwerk, 411 F.2d at 352.
10. Rather than simply identifying “Volkswagen” vehicles, the repair shop would have
to describe the vehicles in a circuitous manner, such as by noting that the repair shop
specializes in vehicles manufactured by a German company including various models that
were widely popular in the late sixties, one model of which starred in its own movie.
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services and to describe his own.
Courts have not extended the
nominative fair use defense beyond plain-text versions of the trademark
at issue to other trademark forms such as logos or product designs.
Manufacturers of “complementary” goods, such as protective covers
for iPod mp3 players, and providers of “complementary” services, such
as repair services for Volkswagen automobiles, however, often depict
the “original” underlying product, rather than the plain-text version of
the trademark, as a means to communicate the complementary
12
relationship between that product and their own goods and services.
In depicting that original product, a manufacturer of complementary
goods may also be depicting the trademark owner’s logo and/or
protected product design. For example, the advertising and packaging
of the many products spawned by the iPod digital music players often
feature not only the iPod word mark, but also pictures of actual iPod
13
devices or depictions of the iPod product design. To advertise the
vibrating bunny, the manufacturer included a picture of an actual OralB toothbrush, with the Oral-B trademark clearly visible on the front of
14
the toothbrush.
Manufacturers of original products, on the other hand, tend to
oppose the use of their products on packaging and in advertisements
11. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir.
2005).
12. This Article will use the term “original” to refer to the product of the trademark
holder and “complementary” to refer to any goods or services that complement that product
or that require that product for their very utility. Further, this Article will use the term
“goods” to encompass both goods and services, unless otherwise indicated.
13. For example, the Author recently purchased an “iTrip.” Notwithstanding that the
manufacturer failed to include any generic product description (it is a device that permits an
iPod digital music player to be played remotely through a car stereo system), she knew that it
applied to iPod devices in general because it included the iPOD plain-text trademark and a
picture of an iPod device on the packaging. Furthermore, she knew it applied to a particular
iPod device because it included the word mark iPOD MINI and a drawing of an iPod Mini
device, among various other models also depicted. Apple has registered several trademarks
for its plain text and product designs. See U.S. Trademark No. 2,835,698 (registered April 27,
2004) (“portable and handheld digital electronic devices for recording, organizing,
transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files; computer software for use in
organizing, transmitting, manipulating, and reviewing audio files on portable and handheld
digital electronic devices”); U.S. Trademark No. 3,365,816 (registered January 8, 2008)
(“[p]ortable and handheld digital electronic devices for recording, organizing, transmitting,
manipulating, and reviewing text, data, image, and audio files”). See also David Orozco &
James Conley, Shape of Things to Come, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2008, at R6, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121018802603674487.html?mod=googlenews_wsj. However,
there was no indication on the iTrip packaging that Apple had licensed the manufacturer to
use any of its trademarks.
14. See LoveHoney, supra note 1.
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relating to complementary products, and often assert trademark
15
infringement under the Lanham Act to stop the practice. Because
courts have limited nominative fair use to plain-text versions of
trademarks, one’s use of the original product on packaging for or in
advertising of complementary goods may not fall within the nominative
fair use defense and has been found to be impermissible under the
16
Lanham Act. This Article examines whether nominative fair use could
encompass such use.
First, in Part I, this Article provides background concerning federal
protection for trademarks, specifically logos and product designs, and
highlights why classic, descriptive fair use has not been available as a
defense for cases involving complementary uses of logos and product
designs. In Part II, this Article examines the nominative fair use
defense, including, in particular, the Ninth and Third Circuits’ divergent
approaches regarding infringement liability. This Article suggests that
any trademark infringement action relating to nominative uses should
follow the Supreme Court’s descriptive fair use analysis and require
proof of likelihood of confusion as a prerequisite. Part III examines
courts’ applications of nominative fair use, which they have not
extended to encompass logos or product designs. In the Conclusion,
this Article ultimately concludes that the use of an original product,
including any trademarked product design or logo, in conjunction with
the sale of a complementary product (or provision of a complementary
service) is a fair use that, even given some likelihood of confusion, may
17
insulate a defendant from trademark infringement liability.

15. The Lanham Act prohibits one’s use of the trademark of another in a way that is
likely to confuse the consuming public as to the source, sponsorship, or approval of the goods
at issue. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000).
Trademark owners have an obligation to police their trademarks and oppose potential
unauthorized uses of those marks. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Yoshida Int’l., Inc.,
393 F. Supp. 502, 512 (E.D.N.Y. 1975). With such an obligation, it is curious why a trademark
holder who attempts to police its trademark from unauthorized uses would at the same time
be making one of the “dumbest” financial moves of the year. See supra note 2 (Fortune
Magazine voted Proctor and Gamble’s actions in sending the cease and desist letter to
LoveHoney as one of the dumbest moments in business.).
16. See Liquid Glass Enters. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. N.J.
1998) (prohibiting the use of the PORSCHE logo and an actual Porsche automobile in
advertising a car polish). When an original product is used in a complementary manner,
trademark infringement liability would depend on whether a trademark is visible on the
original product, or whether the product itself is a trademark. If no trademark is visible and
the product is not a protected product design, then there would be no basis for a finding of
trademark infringement.
17. This Article specifically addresses trademark infringement liability and leaves for
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TRADEMARKS—LOGOS AND PRODUCT DESIGN

A trademark includes “any word, name, symbol, or device . . . used
by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from
those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the
18
goods, even if that source is unknown.”
Virtually anything that
possesses the ability to distinguish and identify goods and to indicate
19
source can serve as a trademark. Thus, to the extent that it possesses
20
this ability, even the design of the good itself may become a trademark.
When any of the possible embodiments is capable of serving as a
trademark, it is said to be “distinctive.” No singular basis exists,
however, for determining when this exists for each of the different
embodiments.
Words become trademarks, or “word-marks,” depending on where
they fall along a spectrum of distinctiveness. An arbitrary, fanciful, or
suggestive word is inherently distinctive; a descriptive word is capable of
acquiring distinctiveness through secondary meaning; and a generic
21
word is never distinctive. To apply the generic-descriptive-suggestivearbitrary-fanciful “distinctiveness spectrum” effectively, one must be
able
to
distinguish
between
generic,
descriptive,
and
suggestive/arbitrary/fanciful words. Imprecise lines separate generic
words from descriptive, and descriptive words from suggestive, yet the
22
significance between these designations is critical. The determination
another day an exhaustive (and exhausting) evaluation of trademark dilution liability. For an
exceptional analysis of modern trademark dilution, including underlying cognitive theories
concerning consumer responses to trademarks, see Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2007-2008).
18. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The Lanham Act provides a similar
definition for service marks: “The term ‘service mark’ means any word, name, symbol, or
device . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish the services of one person . . . from
the services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is
unknown.” Id. For clarity and uniformity, the author has chosen to use the terms
“trademark” and “goods” throughout the following discussion. Unless otherwise indicated,
those terms include “service marks” and “services” respectively. The term “trademark” will
be used hereinafter to designate both trademarks and service marks.
19. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 164 (1995) (explaining, “[i]t
is the source–distinguishing ability of a mark-not its ontological status as color, shape,
fragrance, word, or sign–that permits it to serve these basic purposes”).
20. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 216 (2000).
21. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2d Cir.
1976).
22. See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297, 307-08 (3d Cir. 1986).
[T]hese distinctions are crucial. If we hold a term arbitrary or suggestive, we treat it
as distinctive, and it automatically qualifies trademark protection . . . . If we hold a
mark descriptive, a claimant can still establish trademark rights, but only if it proves
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that a word is descriptive, for example, affects not only the acquisition
of trademark rights for the trademark holder, but also the strength of
23
any resulting trademark.
In a strict application of the traditional distinctiveness spectrum
analysis, a fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive logo or product design would
be immediately protectable as inherently distinctive, a descriptive logo
or product design would be protectable only upon acquiring
distinctiveness, and a generic logo or product design would not be
protectable.
The traditional spectrum, however, ineffectually
differentiates protectable logos and product designs from those that lack
the ability to distinguish the goods of one manufacturer from those of
another. From a strictly semantic perspective, the terms “descriptive”
and “suggestive” denote underlying definitional capabilities that words
24
clearly possess, but logos and product designs may not. Descriptive
terms, for example, are words that describe the characteristics of the
goods at issue; suggestive terms call to mind the goods but do not
25
describe them. Inasmuch as it is difficult to demarcate word marks, it
is even more difficult to demarcate logos and product designs into
26
suggestive and descriptive categories. On the other hand, logos and
that consumers identify the term with the claimant, for that identification proves
secondary meaning . . . . Finally, if we hold a designation generic, it is never
protectable because even complete “success . . . in securing public identification . . .
cannot deprive competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an article
by name.”
Id. at 297 (quoting Abercrombie & Fitch, 537 F.2d at 9).
23. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (rev’d on
other grounds) (“Distinctiveness is a crucial trademark concept, which places marks on a
ladder reflecting their inherent strength or weakness. The degree of distinctiveness of a mark
governs in part the breadth of the protection it can command.”). See also Zatarains, Inc. v.
Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786 (5th Cir. 1983).
24. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach To
Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 658-59 (1999).
[T]he test is based on a linguistic reference between word and product and has
(unsurprisingly) proved an unworkable formulation for directing our assessment of
the distinctiveness of shapes outside of very obvious categories. Linguistically
conditioned tests may enable courts to discern the meaning of textual matter, but
such tests should not be mechanically applied to determine the meaning of matter
for which they offer little evaluative assistance. Analytical devices should not
frustrate the purposes of trademark protection by obscuring the reasons for denial
or grants of protection.
Id.
25. See Zatarains, 698 F.2d at 790-91.
26. See Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267 (2d Cir. 1995),
wherein the district court found a pine tree-shaped trademark to be suggestive, while on
appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found it to be descriptive. The district court
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product designs exist that seem either completely arbitrary or totally
generic for the goods they represent. These symbols denote simple,
unitary concepts. It is not difficult to imagine a generic symbol for a ball
27
(a circle) versus an arbitrary one (a moose).
Further, standards for evaluating the distinctiveness of non-word
trademarks like product designs have evolved in a manner that treats
them all like descriptive word marks by requiring a showing of
28
secondary meaning. It is not the demarcation of a logo or product
design as descriptive that is essential to this analysis, but rather the
ability of the public to use it fairly in a descriptive manner.
A. Descriptive Fair Use
As explained supra, trademark protection is available for descriptive
29
words that have acquired distinctiveness.
Due to the underlying

rejected the alleged infringer’s claim of fair use and granted summary judgment to the
trademark owner on that issue. Id. at 269. The district court further determined that the
defense of fair use applied only when the trademark owner’s mark was descriptive, and, thus
was not applicable here because the pine tree-shaped mark was suggestive. Id. at 268. See
also Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A 1977)
(evaluating distinctiveness of a design mark by considering “whether it was a ‘common’ basic
shape or design, . . . unique or unusual in a particular field, . . . a mere refinement of a
commonly-adopted and well-known form of ornamentation for a particular class of goods
viewed by the public as a dress or ornamentation for the goods, or . . . capable of creating a
commercial impression distinct from the accompanying words”).
27. See Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir.
2008) (citing 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, §
12:34 (4th ed. 2008) (“A mark that consists of an illustration of the goods themselves may be
‘generic,’ and hence incapable of serving a trademark function at all.”); Kendall-Jackson
Winery, Ltd. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1049 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that an
image of a grape leaf on a wine bottle was not deemed sufficiently distinctive to be a source
identifier)) (explaining that “[j]ust as a word or phrase may be classified as generic, so too can
an image or logo that describes a category of goods or services rather than a specific source”).
The court in Boston Duck Tours ultimately concluded, however, “that the image of a duck
splashing in water . . . [was] highly descriptive for the parties’ services.” Boston Duck Tours,
531 F.3d at 28.
28. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
The phrase “secondary meaning” originally arose in the context of word marks,
where it served to distinguish the source-identifying meaning from the ordinary, or
“primary,” meaning of the word. “Secondary meaning” has since come to refer to
the acquired, source-identifying meaning of a nonword mark as well. It is often a
misnomer in that context, since nonword marks ordinarily have no “primary”
meaning. Clarity might well be served by using the term “acquired meaning” in
both the word-mark and the nonword-mark contexts–but in this opinion we follow
what has become the conventional terminology.
Id. at 211 n. 4.
29. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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expressive function of descriptive words that have acquired trademark
30
status, trademark holders may not exclusively control them.
Competitors necessarily require such words to describe the nature and
characteristics of their own goods. Thus, in what is known as classic, or
“descriptive,” fair use, the Lanham Act permits one to employ the
words of a descriptive trademark in their descriptive sense to describe
31
one’s own goods.
Even in the event that there is a likelihood of
32
confusion between one’s descriptive use of a word and the trademark
holder’s trademark use of it, descriptive fair use may insulate one from
33
liability. In fact, the Supreme Court roundly rejected the notion that
descriptive fair use and likelihood of confusion were mutually
34
exclusive. In KP Permanent Make-Up, the Court clearly dictated that
the trademark holder’s burden to prove likelihood of confusion was not
subsidiary to the alleged infringer’s burden to prove descriptive fair use.
The defense of descriptive fair use does not include a concomitant
requirement to negate confusion. The Court described such a scenario
35
as “incoherent.”
[A] look at the typical course of litigation in an infringement
action points up the incoherence of placing a burden to show
nonconfusion on a defendant. If a plaintiff succeeds in making
out a prima facie case of trademark infringement, including the
element of likelihood of consumer confusion, the defendant may
offer rebutting evidence to undercut the force of the plaintiff’s
evidence on this (or any) element, or raise an affirmative defense
to bar relief even if the prima facie case is sound, or do both. But

30. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 12-13 (2d Cir.
1976).
31. See Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 33(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000).
32. The Lanham Act prohibits one’s use of another’s trademark in a way that “is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval” of his goods by another. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A). See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125. Courts determine liability by evaluating various factors that tend to
demonstrate whether confusion is likely. These “likelihood of confusion” factors vary slightly
by circuit but ultimately focus on common analyses. See ANNE GILSON LALONDE ET AL.,
TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 5.02 (2008); William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49, 67 (2008) (“[M]ost trademark infringement cases
turn on application of a complex multifactor test. Although its precise composition differs
from one circuit to the next, the fundamental attributes remain the same.”).
33. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 123
(2004).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 120.
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it would make no sense to give the defendant a defense of
showing affirmatively that the plaintiff cannot succeed in proving
some element (like confusion); all the defendant needs to do is to
leave the factfinder unpersuaded that the plaintiff has carried its
own burden on that point. . . . Put another way, it is only when a
plaintiff has shown likely confusion by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant could have any need of an affirmative
defense, but under Lasting’s [the trademark holder’s] theory the
defense would be foreclosed in such a case. It defies logic to
argue that a defense may not be asserted in the only situation
36
where it becomes relevant.
This affirmative defense logically extends beyond trademarks
categorized as merely descriptive to suggestive and arbitrary
37
trademarks. It is the defendant’s use of the trademark rather than the

36. Id. (internal citation omitted). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28 (1995).
The fair use defense recognized in this Section can be applicable even if the
trademark owner presents evidence sufficient to prove a likelihood of confusion. If
the manner of use by the defendant is reasonable in light of the commercial
justification for the use, the possibility or even certainty that some prospective
purchasers will perceive the term as an indication of source despite the
reasonableness of the defendant’s use is not sufficient to deprive the defendant of
the right to employ the term in its descriptive sense. Thus, a defendant who uses a
descriptive term fairly and in good faith to describe its goods or services is not liable
for infringement even if some residual confusion is likely. However, the strength of
the plaintiff’s mark and the extent of likely or actual confusion are important factors
in determining whether a use is fair. Surveys and other evidence relating to the
perceptions of prospective purchasers are thus relevant to the application of the
defense, and a use that is likely to create substantial confusion will not ordinarily be
considered a fair use.
Id. (emphasis added). See also McGeveran, supra note 32, at 84 (citing Shakespeare Co. v.
Silstar Corp. of Am. Inc., 110 F.3d 234, 243 (4th Cir. 1997)) (Conditioning the defense on a
negative confusion finding was absurd. “[T]he plaintiff has the burden to prove consumer
confusion. In the words of the Fourth Circuit, ‘[A] defense which an be considered only when
the prima facie case has failed is no defense at all.’”).
37. Car-Freshner Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d. 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Regardless whether the protected mark is descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful as
used in connection with the product or service covered by the mark, the public’s right to use
descriptive words or images in good faith in their ordinary descriptive sense must prevail over
the exclusivity claims of the trademark owner.”). In contrast, Anne Gilson LaLonde takes
the compelling view that fanciful trademarks are not capable of descriptive fair use. See
LALONDE ET AL., supra note 32, §11.08[3][d][i] (2008) (claiming that “[w]hen a mark has no
other meaning besides its use as a mark, it cannot qualify for the fair use defense because it
has no descriptive meaning to monopolize”). Some courts even maintain that only
descriptive trademarks are susceptible to the descriptive fair use defense. See National
Football League Props. v. Playoff Corp., 808 F. Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Tex. 1992).
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trademark’s classification along the distinctiveness spectrum that is
38
significant. Although BLACKBERRY is arbitrary for sophisticated
cell phones, for example, it is descriptive as a flavor or even color
39
designation for various products. Thus, it is not only descriptive
trademarks that are susceptible to the affirmative defense of classic, or
40
“descriptive,” fair use.
Similarly, non-word marks may be used
41
descriptively, and as such would be susceptible to the fair use defense.
42
A doctrine known as “nominative fair use” derives from the same

38. See EMI Catalogue P’ship. v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulous Inc., No. 997922, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *21 (2d Cir. Sept. 15, 2000) (“Whether a use is
descriptive must be determined by assessing the manner in which the mark is used with
respect to the product or service sold by the alleged infringer. How the senior mark holder
used the mark in conjunction with its own product is not relevant to this inquiry.”). See also
LALONDE ET AL., supra note 32, § 11.08[3][d][i][A] (“[I]n a fair use case, the mark being
used need not be classified as ‘descriptive’ on the distinctiveness scale. A defendant should
not need to show that the plaintiff’s mark is descriptive but instead must show that its own
use of the mark is descriptive of its products.”).
39. For example, see IZZE Sparkling Blackberry soda or the 2009 SCION xB in
Blackberry Crush Metallic.
40. Car-Freshner Corp., 70 F.3d at 269 (explaining that one party’s exclusive right to
use a mark “will not prevent others from using the word or image [constituting the mark] in
good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trademark”).
41. See id. (“It is a fundamental principle marking an outer boundary of the trademark
monopoly that, although trademark rights may be acquired in a word or image with
descriptive qualities, the acquisition of such rights will not prevent others from using the word
or image in good faith in its descriptive sense, and not as a trademark.”). The court also
noted the descriptive fair use doctrine could
apply only to marks consisting of terms or images with descriptive qualities. That is
because only such terms or images are capable of being used by others in their
primary descriptive sense. But it should make no difference whether the plaintiff’s
mark is to be classed on the descriptive tier of the trademark ladder (where
protection is unavailable except on a showing of secondary meaning). What matters
is whether the defendant is using the protected word or image descriptively, and not
as a mark.
Id. Cf. Herman Miller, Inc. v. A. Studio s.r.l., No. 1:04-CV-781, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28647,
at *19 (W.D. Mich. May 9, 2006) (concluding that the alleged infringer’s “inability to
satisfactorily articulate its descriptive use may be attributable to the fact that it is difficult to
conceive how the design configuration of the lounge chair can be used descriptively”).
42. Judge Kozinski coined the phrase “nominative fair use” in his decision in New Kids
on the Block v. News America Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992), but the legal
concept behind it was not novel. See, for example, Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359
(1924), wherein the alleged infringer, Prestonettes was permitted to use the plaintiff’s
trademark, COTY, on the label for Prestonettes’ perfumes and powders. The Court
maintained that “[w]hen the [trade]mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public . . .
[there is] no such sanctity in the word as to prevent its being used to tell the truth.” Id. at 368.
Further, courts have long recognized that a defendant could use the plaintiff’s trademark to
identify the plaintiff’s product for purposes of resale and comparative advertising. The resale
doctrine permits one to use the trademark of another in selling authentic, trademarked goods,
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underlying expressive and competitive principles as descriptive fair
43
use. Courts disagree, however, whether it is an affirmative defense like
descriptive fair use, which necessitates a preliminary finding of
likelihood of confusion, or whether it involves a “non-trademark use . . .
44
to which the infringement laws simply do not apply.”
II. NOMINATIVE FAIR USE
Nominative fair use permits one to use the trademark of another to
45
describe or identify the trademark holder’s goods.
Moreover,
nominative fair use may exist in situations where one’s use of another’s
trademark not only identifies the trademark holder’s goods but also aids
46
in describing one’s own. In fact, according to the Ninth Circuit, one’s
use of another’s trademark to describe one’s own goods is “the standard
case of nominative fair use: Only rarely, if ever, will a defendant choose
to refer to the plaintiff’s product unless that reference ultimately helps
47
to describe the defendant’s own product.”
Some even regard

even if the trademark owner has not authorized the sale. One may also use another’s
trademark in truthful advertising comparing one’s product to that of the trademark owner.
Yet many courts and commentators maintain such uses must not create any likelihood of
confusion. Again, this misses the fundamental point that trademark infringement liability
requires a finding a likelihood of confusion. Comparative advertising must accommodate
some amount of confusion. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
43. In New Kids on the Block, for instance, Judge Kozinski explained, “[m]uch useful
social and commercial discourse would be all but impossible if speakers were under threat of
an infringement lawsuit every time they made reference to a person, company or product by
using its trademark.” New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 307.
44. Id. See discussion infra, Part II.
45. See LALONDE ET AL., supra note 32, § 11.08 [3] [d] (explaining that “[s]ome courts
recognize a judge-made variation on the statutory fair use doctrine, calling it ‘nominative fair
use’ and allowing the use of another’s trademark under certain limited circumstances. In
these cases, a defendant uses a trademark that refers to another party’s product . . . “). See
also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005)
(explaining that “by definition, nominative use involves the use of another’s trademark in
order to describe the trademark owner’s own product”).
46. See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002). In Ty, Inc. v.
Publications Int’l Ltd., the court explained that nominative fair use “naturally extends to
situations in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to describe the plaintiff’s product
‘even if the defendant’s ultimate goal is to describe his own product.’” Ty, Inc. v. Publications
Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420, *15 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (quoting
Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151). See also Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 214 (citing KP
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 328 F.3d 1061, 1072 (9th Cir. 2003))
(Nominative fair use exists “even if the alleged infringer’s ultimate goal is to describe his own
product.”) (emphasis omitted).
47. Ty, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420 at *15 (quoting Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151, n.8).
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nominative use as simply another form of descriptive use.
Nominative use is deemed permissible because there are
circumstances when there is no other way to refer to another’s goods
49
without using the trademark associated with those goods. Prohibiting
one’s use of the trademark in such situations would force one to
50
describe the trademarked goods via a linguistically circuitous route.
Instead, nominative fair use permits one to describe a TIFFANY lamp,
rather than a lamp “from a prestigious New York company where
51
Audrey Hepburn once liked to breakfast.” In turn, one’s use of the
simple, succinct language of the trademark rather than an oblique
substitute improves communication and thereby provides an important
52
commercial and social benefit.
Courts differ in their approaches to and applications of nominative
fair use. Traditionally, courts determine trademark infringement
liability by evaluating various factors that tend to demonstrate whether

48. See Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Under trademark law, trademark owners cannot prevent others from making a
descriptive use of their trademark. ‘While a trademark conveys an exclusive right to
the use of a mark in commerce in the area reserved, that right generally does not
prevent one who trades a branded product from accurately describing it by its brand
name, so long as the trader does not create confusion by implying an affiliation with
the owner of the product.’ This type of descriptive use of a trademark is protected
under the doctrine of nominative fair use.
Id. at 496 (citing Dow Jones & Co. v. Int’l Sec. Exch., Inc., 451 F.3d 295, 308 (2d Cir. 2006))
(internal citation omitted). But see, Cairns, 292 F.3d at 1151 (maintaining that “the classic
[descriptive] fair use analysis is appropriate where a defendant has used the plaintiff’s mark
only to describe his own product, and not at all to describe the plaintiff’s product”).
49. See New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 306 (9th
Cir. 1992) (explaining that sometimes it is “virtually impossible to refer to a particular
product for purposes of comparison, criticism, point of reference or any other such purpose
without using the mark”).
50. See id.
With many well-known trademarks, such as Jell-O, Scotch tape and Kleenex, there
are equally informative non-trademark words describing the products (gelatin,
cellophane tape and facial tissue). But sometimes there is no descriptive substitute,
and a problem closely related to genericity and descriptiveness is presented when
many goods and services are effectively identifiable only by their trademarks. For
example, one might refer to “the two-time world champions” or “the professional
basketball team from Chicago,” but it’s far simpler (and more likely to be
understood) to refer to the Chicago Bulls. In such cases, use of the trademark does
not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because the mark is used only
to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.
Id.
51. Tiffany, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
52. See supra note 42.
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confusion is likely. These “likelihood of confusion” factors vary slightly
53
by circuit but ultimately focus on common analyses. Many courts,
however, consider nominative use to be at odds with traditional notions
54
of trademark liability. “Because [nominative use] does not implicate
the source-identification function that is the purpose of trademark, it
does not constitute unfair competition; such use is fair because it does
55
not imply sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”
Courts approaching nominative fair use from this jurisprudential
perspective do not consider the traditional likelihood of confusion test
to be relevant to the analysis. Instead, they favor the test that Judge
Kozinski articulated in New Kids on the Block:
First, the product or service in question must be one not readily
identifiable without use of the trademark; second, only so much
of the mark or marks may be used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product or service; and third, the user must do
nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest
56
sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.
53. See LALONDE ET AL., supra note 32. See also McGeveran, supra note 32, at 67
(“Most trademark infringement cases turn on application of a complex multifactor test.
Although its precise composition differs from one circuit to the next, the fundamental
attributes remain the same.”).
54. See New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (explaining that “[s]uch nominative use
of a mark—where the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is pressed
into service—lies outside the strictures of trademark law”).
55. Id.
56. Id. In terms of the first prong, courts tend to vacillate between evaluating the
trademark owners product and the alleged infringer’s product, which raises the question,
which product did Judge Kozinski intend? In New Kids on the Block, Judge Kozinski
asserted, “[W]here the defendant uses a trademark to describe the plaintiff’s product, rather
than its own, we hold that a commercial user is entitled to a nominative fair use defense . . . .”
Id. (emphasis added). See also Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d
211, 224 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that “by definition, nominative use involves the use of
another’s trademark in order to describe the trademark owner’s own product”). See also
Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2002).
“There is no other way that Ms. Welles can identify or describe herself and her
services without venturing into absurd descriptive phrases. To describe herself as the
‘nude model selected by Mr. Hefner’s magazine as its number-one prototypical
woman for the year 1981’ would be impractical as well as ineffectual in identifying
Terri Welles to the public. . . .” Just as the newspapers in New Kids could only
identify the band clearly by using its trademarked name, so can Welles only identify
herself clearly by using PEI’s trademarked title.
Id. at 802 (citation omitted). As indicated supra note 46 and accompanying text, nominative
fair use
naturally extends to situations in which the defendant uses the plaintiff’s mark to
describe the plaintiff’s product ‘even if the defendant’s ultimate goal is to describe his
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This three-part test “replaces the ‘likelihood of confusion’ test for
57
trademark cases where nominative fair use is asserted.” The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit later explained that
“application of the [likelihood of confusion test], which focuses on the
similarity of the mark used by the plaintiff and defendant, would lead to
the incorrect conclusion that virtually all nominative uses are confusing”
because “when a defendant uses a trademark nominally, the trademark
will be identical to the plaintiff’s mark, at least in terms of the words in
58
question.” Instead, the third prong of the Ninth Circuit’s test requires
that one alleging nominative fair use “must do nothing that would, in
conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
59
trademark holder.”
A finding in favor of the plaintiff trademark
holder under this prong destroys any nominative fair use defense. In
other words, a finding that the defendant’s use of the trademark
suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder results in
60
a finding of trademark infringement liability.

own product.’ The [Ninth Circuit] observed that ‘this is in fact the standard case of
nominative fair use: Only rarely, if ever, will a defendant choose to refer to the
plaintiff’s product unless that reference ultimately helps to describe the defendant’s
own product.’
Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420, at *15 (N.D.
Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (quoting Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1151, n.8 (9th Cir.
2002)).
57. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 220 (emphasis omitted). See also Playboy
Enters., 279 F.3d at 801 (“In cases in which the defendant raises a nominative use defense, the
[New Kids] three-factor test should be applied instead of the [Ninth Circuit’s traditional] test
for likelihood of confusion . . . . The three-factor test better evaluates the likelihood of
confusion in nominative use cases.”).
58. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 220.
59. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992). In New Kids on the Block, Judge Kozinski found that nothing in the polls at issue
suggested “endorsement or joint sponsorship by the New Kids.” Id. at 308-09. He further
explained that by asking whether any of the New Kids might be a “turn off,” the USA Today
announcement implied “quite the contrary” to joint sponsorship or endorsement of the polls
by the New Kids. Id.
60. The Lanham Act precludes a likelihood that consumers would be confused as to
source or sponsorship; it does not preclude the suggestion of sponsorship or endorsement.
The two are not necessarily equivalent. “Indeed, a defendant may have a more difficult time
showing that it did nothing to cause confusion under the nominative fair use standard, rather
than defeating a plaintiff’s prima facie showing that confusion was likely to result.”
McGeveran, supra note 32, at 96 (emphasis in original). But see Brother Records, Inc. v.
Jardine, 318 F.3d 900, 909, n.5 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “the third requirement of the
nominative fair use defense—the lack of anything that suggests sponsor-ship or endorsement-is merely the other side of the likelihood-of-confusion coin”).
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Notwithstanding Judge Kozinski’s assertion that the traditional
likelihood of confusion analysis does not properly deal with the specific
issues concerning nominative fair use, courts have interpreted the Ninth
Circuit’s third prong, regarding suggestion of sponsorship or
endorsement simply as a traditional likelihood of confusion test, using
61
62
traditional likelihood of confusion factors.
In Liquid Glass, for
instance, the court recited the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test as
instructive to Liquid Glass’s nominative fair use defense, but then, after
evaluating prongs one and two, the court conflated prong three into its
63
circuit’s likelihood of confusion analysis.
In effect, the court
performed its circuit’s traditional likelihood of confusion analysis and
simply added two additional factors—prongs one and two of the Ninth
Circuit’s test—to foreclose Liquid Glass’s nominative fair use defense.
Essentially, the court in Liquid Glass would find nominative fair use
only in the absence of a likelihood of confusion and prongs one and two
64
of the Ninth Circuit’s test.
In contrast, other courts consider a finding of likelihood of confusion
65
to be a prerequisite to any nominative fair use analysis. According to
this jurisprudential approach, which is similar to that articulated by the
66
Supreme Court regarding descriptive fair use, absent a finding a
likelihood of confusion and concomitant liability, there is no need for
the defendant to invoke a fair use defense. Accordingly, this approach
recognizes that likelihood of confusion does not negate fair use. The
61. See Liquid Glass Enters. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402-04
(D.N.J. 1998). See also Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 496-98 (S.D.N.Y.
2008). “Under the doctrine of nominative fair use, [a] defendant may use a plaintiff’s
trademark to identify the plaintiff’s goods so long as there is no likelihood of confusion about
the source of defendant’s product or the mark-holder’s sponsorship or affiliation.” Id. at 496
(citations omitted).
62. See Liquid Glass Enters., 8 F. Supp. 2d 398. See infra note 64 and accompanying
text.
63. Liquid Glass Enters., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (“Finally, and most importantly in both
defeating Liquid Glass’s fair use defense and establishing Porsche’s infringement and false
designation claims, this court finds that Porsche will likely prevail in demonstrating that the
use of Porsche’s trademarks and trade dress in Liquid Glass’s advertisements would likely
confuse consumers as to Porsche’s connection with Liquid Glass.”) (emphasis added). See
infra note 64 and accompanying text.
64. Prongs one and two, however, should be irrelevant absent a finding of likelihood of
confusion. In other words, without a finding of likelihood confusion, one wonders what
purpose is served by evaluating whether the product in question is readily identifiable without
use of the trademark (prong one), and whether only so much of the mark is used as is
reasonably necessary to identify the product (prong two).
65. See Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2005).
66. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111 (2004).
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court in Ty, Inc. v. Publications International explained:
[B]oth the [Lanham Act] and the common law of unfair
competition support the premise that fair use can occur along
with some degree of confusion. While the Supreme Court
specifically declined to address the nominative fair use defense
[in KP Permanent Make-Up], I am persuaded that its logic
applies with similar force to defendants pursuing the defense of
nominative fair use despite the almost certain likelihood of
confusion regarding the source of the mark. While this does not
mean that consumer confusion is not relevant to the issue of fair
use, it does suggest that I should not disregard a defense of
nominative fair use simply because a likelihood of confusion
exists. The New Kids test provides sound criteria for assessing
when nominative use is fair or unfair, despite a likelihood of
67
confusion among consumers.
In like manner, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals found no
meaningful difference between nominative and classic fair use that
would warrant excluding a likelihood of confusion analysis for one while
requiring it for the other, and thus expressly disagreed with the Ninth
Circuit that the likelihood of confusion test should be supplanted
68
entirely in cases involving nominative fair use.
The Third Circuit
concluded:
We adopt a bifurcated approach that tests for confusion and
fairness in separate inquiries in order to distribute the burden of
67. Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420, at
*19-20 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005) (citations omitted).
68. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 425 F.3d at 219. The court stated,
It must be recognized at the outset that ‘fair use’ presents a fact pattern different
from that of a normal infringement suit. The typical situation in a trademark case
involves the defendant’s having passed off another’s mark as its own or having used
a similar name, confusing the public as to precisely whose goods are being sold.
Likelihood of confusion is the sole issue. But the fair use defense, by reason of the
circumstances giving rise to its applicability, alters the premise somewhat. The
defendant is not purporting to be selling goods or services that the plaintiff has
trademarked, but, rather, is using plaintiff’s mark in order to refer to defendant’s
own goods or to the goods of the trademark owner in a way that might confuse the
public as to the relationship between the two. Accordingly, the legal framework still
involves a showing that A’s reference to B’s mark will likely confuse the public, but
the analysis does not end there, for the use may nonetheless be permissible if it is
‘fair.’
Id. at 217 (citations omitted).
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proof appropriately between the parties at each stage of the
analysis. The defendant has no burden to show fairness until the
plaintiff first shows confusion. Furthermore, by properly treating
nominative fair use as an affirmative defense, our approach
allows for the possibility that a district court could find a certain
level of confusion, but still ultimately determine the use to be
fair. By contrast, a unified likelihood of confusion test would
require a defendant to negate likelihood of confusion by
undercutting the [likelihood of confusion] factors. Because the
Supreme Court explicitly rejected such a proposition in KP
69
Permanent Make-Up, we decline to adopt it.
The position of the Third Circuit in this matter follows logical
reasoning (and parallels the position of the Supreme Court in KP
70
Permanent Make-Up).
The Lanham Act prohibits one’s use of
another’s trademark in a way that “is likely to confuse, to cause mistake,
or to deceive” “as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval” of his goods
71
by another.
As explained supra, courts determine liability by
evaluating various factors that tend to demonstrate whether confusion is
likely. If a use does not meet the threshold requirements for
infringement liability under the Lanham Act, then the trademark holder
has no federal remedy, and the alleged infringer need not invoke any
fair use defense. Only when the trademark holder proves likelihood of
confusion must the alleged infringer invoke a fair use defense to avoid
72
infringement liability.

69. Id. at 232. The Third Circuit also formulated its own three-part test for evaluating
a nominative fair use defense. The Third Circuit instructed:
Once plaintiff has met its burden of proving that confusion is likely, the burden then
shifts to defendant to show that its nominative use of plaintiff’s marks is nonetheless
fair. In this Circuit, we have today adopted a test for nominative fair use in which a
court will pose three questions: (1) Is the use of the plaintiff’s mark necessary to
describe both plaintiff’s product or service and defendant’s product or service? (2) Is
only so much of the plaintiff’s mark used as is necessary to describe plaintiff’s
products or services? (3) Does the defendant’s conduct or language reflect the true
and accurate relationship between plaintiff and defendant’s products or services? If
each of these questions can be answered in the affirmative, the use will be
considered a fair one, regardless of whether likelihood of confusion exists.
Id.
70. KP Permanent Make-Up, 543 U.S. 111.
71. See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125.
72. See McGeveran, supra note 32, at 66 (explaining “breathing room for fair uses
requires toleration, on the margins, of some degree of consumer confusion”). Yet, as this
Article explains in more detail infra Part III, not all courts view trademark infringement
liability and fair use in this manner.
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That is not to say that Judge Kozinski was incorrect. In formulating
the nominative fair use test, Judge Kozinski noted that uses that neither
implicate the source-identification function of the trademark nor imply
or suggest sponsorship or endorsement of the trademark holder lie
73
“outside the strictures of trademark law.” He employed what appears
to be a heightened standard for liability, beyond that of likelihood of
confusion: whether the defendant’s use suggests or implies source or
74
sponsorship by the plaintiff.
In essence, this approach seems to
acknowledge that likelihood of confusion may exist without a finding of
liability. It is the subsequent courts (and commentators) that conflate
“likelihood of confusion” with “implication of source or sponsorship”
75
that are in error.
III. APPLICATION OF NOMINATIVE FAIR USE BEYOND PLAIN-TEXT
WORD MARKS
Courts have limited nominative fair use to the plain-text, nonstylized versions of the word marks at issue. Judge Kozinski, in
explaining the rationale behind the defense, noted that it applies “where
the only word reasonably available to describe a particular thing is

73. New Kids on the Block v. News America Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir.
1992).
74. See id. at 306. Judge Kozinski asserted that one’s nominative use of a trademark
would “not imply sponsorship or endorsement of the product because the mark is used only
to describe the thing, rather than to identify its source.” Id. at 307. Judge Kozinski further
explained that the trademark liability in this case
hinge[d] on one key factual allegation: that the newspapers’ use of the New Kids
name in conducting the unauthorized polls somehow implied that the New Kids
were sponsoring the polls. It is no more reasonably possible, however, to refer to the
New Kids as an entity than it is to refer to the Chicago Bulls, Volkswagens or the
Boston Marathon without using the trademark . . . . While plaintiffs’ trademark
certainly deserves protection against copycats and those who falsely claim that the
New Kids have endorsed or sponsored them, such protection does not extend to
rendering newspaper articles, conversations, polls and comparative advertising
impossible.
Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
75. See McGeveran, supra note 32, at 89 (“Although New Kids itself engaged in
common sense-analysis of the situation before it, the test created there has not fared as well.
Courts following the footsteps of New Kids sowed confusion and seriously deformed the
original proposal.”). See, e.g., Liquid Glass Enters. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp.
2d 398, 403 (D.N.J. 1998); LALONDE ET AL., supra note 32, § 11.08 [3] [k] (“[W]hen a
defendant is using a plaintiff’s trademark to refer to the plaintiff’s goods or services, it should
not be subject to liability under the Lanham Act, provided it is not misleading or untruthful
and confusion is not likely.”) (emphasis added).
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76

pressed into service.”
The various tests that courts have used to
analyze nominative fair use reflect this need-based restriction. In New
Kids for example, Judge Kozinski explained that the defendant
newspapers referenced the New Kids on the Block “only to the extent
77
necessary to identify them as the subject of the polls.” In finding
nominative fair use it was important to the court that the defendant
newspapers had not used the New Kids’ distinctive logo or anything else
that was unnecessary “to make the announcements intelligible to
78
readers.”
Manufacturers of complementary goods, however, often depict the
original, underlying product, rather than the plain-text version of the
trademark, as a means to communicate the complementary relationship
between that product and their own goods and services. In depicting
that original product, a manufacturer of complementary goods or
services may also be depicting the trademark owner’s logo or protected
product design.
In Liquid Glass, the manufacturer of car cleaners and polishes, used
a sleek, shiny Porsche 911 automobile, presumably polished to its shiny
finish with Liquid Glass’s car polish, in various advertisements for that
product. In the advertisements, both the Porsche logo and the
79
PORSCHE trademark were visible on the car. Porsche AG objected
to Liquid Glass’s use of the Porsche 911 automobile, maintaining that
such use was likely to cause consumers to believe that Porsche AG
80
sponsored or in some way endorsed Liquid Glass’s product. Liquid
Glass claimed that its use of the Porsche 911 automobile was fair and
non-infringing because it belonged to the “President of Liquid Glass”
and he had the “right to use his privately owned Porsche to advertise his
81
company’s car polish.”
The court agreed with Porsche AG and prohibited as unnecessary
defendant Liquid Glass’s use of an actual Porsche 911 automobile in
82
advertisements for its car polish product. In evaluating the second
prong of the Ninth Circuit’s nominative fair use test—whether only so
76. New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308 (emphasis added).
77. Id.
78. Id. See also id. at 308 n.7 (explaining that “a soft drink competitor would be
entitled to compare its product to Coca-Cola or Coke, but would not be entitled to use CocaCola’s distinctive lettering”).
79. Liquid Glass Enters., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 399-400.
80. Id. at 403.
81. Id. at 401-02.
82. Id. at 407-08.
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much of the trademark has been used as is reasonably necessary to
identify the product—the court cited as illustrative the Volkswagenwerk
case, wherein the alleged infringing repair shop was permitted to use the
word “Volkswagen” but not its distinctive lettering and color scheme or
83
the encircled “VW” emblem to identify the vehicles that it serviced.
84
Without articulating what trademark uses might be permissible, the
court in Liquid Glass concluded that the manufacturer of the car polish
85
did not need to use the Porsche 911 automobile to describe its products.

83. Id. at 402-03 (citing Volkswagenwerk Aktiengeseelschaft v. Church, 411 F.2d 350
(9th Cir. 1969)).
84. Many, if not most, automobiles, and especially sports cars, can be recognized from
their over-all shape and appearance. One wonders how Liquid Glass could demonstrate the
utility of its product on any automobile except the most “generic” looking models. Further,
one’s use of one’s own car to advertise one’s own complementary product conveys myriad
messages about the product, including, in particular, that the owner trusts in the quality and
performance of the product by demonstrating it on his own, rather expensive, sports car. The
Author maintains that consumers are far more discerning and sophisticated than courts make
them out to be. But see Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 904 (2004).
[C]ourts’ assessment[s] of consumer responses [are] produced by a combination of
different doctrinal concerns and a number of vague standards and judicial
speculations that are structured by analyzing mostly circumstantial evidence under
the various factors. These characteristics of trademark law provide significant scope
for the generation of normative assumptions about what consumers are like and
what they value. [Further], a number of important strands of trademark doctrine
disclose that an “ordinarily prudent consumer” is someone who gets confused
relatively easily, does not want to think very hard, and readily internalizes the
messages trademark proprietors seek to convey about promotional and prestige
goods.
Id.
85. See Liquid Glass Enters. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398; supra
note 61. In Liquid Glass, the court explained that
where Liquid Glass used Porsche’s trademark and trade dress to describe Porsche’s
product, rather than its own, fair use can only be successfully invoked if (1) “the
product or service in question [is] one not readily identifiable without use of the
trademark;” (2) “only so much of the mark or marks is used as is reasonably
necessary to identify the product or service;” and (3) “the user must do nothing that
would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.”
Liquid Glass Enters., 8 F. Supp. 2d at 403 (quoting New Kids on the Block v. New America
Pub’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis added). In the subsequent analysis,
however, the court evaluated the need for Liquid Glass to use the Porsche automobile
(including its trademark and trade dress) to describe Liquid Glass’s products. See also World
Impressions, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 235 F. Supp. 2d 831 (N.D. Ill. 2002), wherein the court
rejected the nominative fair use defense of World Impressions (the alleged infringer) because
World Impressions had used the trademark holder’s stylized word mark (DISNEYLAND)
and one of its logos (an image of the Cinderella Castle) on maps of California tourist
attractions. The court explained that World Impressions’
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In Ty, Inc. v. Publications International, however, the court
suggested that the alleged infringer’s use of Ty’s Heart Logo in various
publications and collectors’ guides did not bar the nominative fair use
86
defense. Rather, the court questioned whether the alleged infringer
used the logo more than was reasonably necessary to identify Ty’s
products—a question of fact that the court could not decide on a motion
87
for summary judgment. The court surmised:
[O]ne might reasonably expect that most collectors of Beanie
Babies could recognize the plush toys without seeing the Ty
han[g]tag displaying the Heart Logo. On the other hand, display
of the logos might be reasonably necessary to assure customers
that the pictured products were, in fact, Ty’s products and not
88
copycat products.
In other words, nominative use might permit one’s use of a logo,
given reasonable necessity to do so. “[W]hat is ‘reasonably necessary to
89
identify the [trademark holder’s] product’ differs from case to case.”
And if nominative fair use might permit one’s use of a trademarked
logo, it might also permit one’s use of any trademark embodiment,
including a product design.
CONCLUSION
One’s use of an original product, including any trademarked logo or
90
product design, in advertising a complementary product could be fair.

use of the stylized form of the word ‘Disneyland’ and the castle design goes beyond
mere nominative use. Although the Disney marks may not be larger than the other
identifiers on [the] maps, [World Impressions] uses the stylized form of the word
‘Disneyland’ and the distinctive castle design as ‘attention-getting symbol[s].’
Moreover, [World Impression’s] use of its own mark in conjunction with the Disney
marks does not save [its] use from being a trademark use. By using the stylized form
of the word ‘Disneyland’ and the castle design, rather than a plain rendition of the
word ‘Disneyland,’ [World Impressions] does more than simply identify
Disneyland’s location on a map. Instead, it implies that Disney sponsored or
endorsed its maps. The court finds that this use is a trademark use, and that
accordingly the fair use defense is unavailable to [World Impressions].
Id. at 843 (citations omitted).
86. Ty, Inc. v. Publications Int’l, Ltd., No. 99 C 5565, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23420
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 25, 2005).
87. Id. at *32-35.
88. Id. at *34.
89. Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 292 F.3d 1139, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002).
90. But see Polyglycoat Corp. v. Environmental Chems., Inc., 509 F. Supp. 36, 39
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Further, some likelihood of confusion is consistent with the
manufacturer of a complementary product being able to communicate
91
its complementary message.
A simple disclaimer regarding the
relationship between the trademark holder and the manufacturer of the
92
complementary product should ameliorate that confusion. Even if a
disclaimer does not do so, it should satisfy the third prong of the Third
Circuit’s nominative fair use test: “Does the defendant’s conduct or
language reflect the true and accurate relationship between plaintiff and
93
defendant’s products or services?”
And, though trite, a picture is worth a thousand words. In a world
that has become increasingly reliant on visual symbols as shortcut
referents for more complex ideas, it may even be competitively
impractical to limit complementary advertising to plain-text word
94
marks. Manufacturers of complementary products may need to use the
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), wherein the court maintained that “a reasonable likelihood of confusion is
inferred from defendant’s use of plaintiff’s exact [stylized] trademark to promote its related
product, the absence of a viable alternative explanation by defendant for its appropriation of
the POLYGLYCOAT mark, and other circumstances of the relevant market.” Id. at 39
(emphasis added).
91. See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use:
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597 (2007) (arguing against formalism
in likelihood of confusion analyses and discussing the importance of the context of the alleged
infringer’s use in determining liability). A contextual analysis “allows trademark law to adapt
and to deal comprehensively with the range of commercial settings to which it applies in
modern economy.” Id. at 1658. And frankly, are people really likely to be confused that
Braun is the source of a bunny-shaped sex toy simply because an Oral-B toothbrush appears
along side of it in an advertisement? The “relevant consuming public” is more likely to
understand the context of the advertisement and the stark, if not humorous, contrast between
the two products than it is to be confused.
92. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 803 (9th Cir. 2002) (intimating
that a disclaimer may help an alleged infringer avoid a suggestion of sponsorship by the
trademark holder). See also Carl Regelmann, Trademark Nominative Fair Use: The
Relevance of the “New Kids on the Block Factors” after the Supreme Court KP Permanent
Make-Up v. Lasting Impression Decision, 16 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL’Y 1, 3031 (2005) (arguing that the Ninth Circuit implicitly may view the presence or absence of a
disclaimer as dispositive in determining whether the alleged infringer has used the trademark
holder’s trademark in a way that suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark
holder).
93. Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 232 (3d Cir.
2005). “Purchasers may be mistaken, but they are not deceived by false representations, and
equity will not enjoin against telling the truth.” KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting
Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 119 (2004). With respect to toothbrush adaptors, mp3
accessories, and car polish, described above, the complementary manufactures are telling the
truth even if it means they have used an original manufacturer’s product to do so.
94. For example, the desktop of the author’s computer includes a symbol (icon) shaped
like a globe with another image of a yellow, red, and orange fox, the coloring and shape of
which suggests flames, partially encircling the globe. This icon represents the “FIREFOX”
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original product to succinctly and effectively advertise the
complementary nature of the products. It seems far more
communicative to depict the actual type of toothbrush that the bunny
complements (or an actual shiny red sports car that the car polish
complements) than to describe the relationship in words. While the
trademark holder often would rather prohibit the use, the benefit to the
public in obtaining concise visual commercial information outweighs the
95
possible harm to the trademark holder.
Further, the alleged harm to the trademark holder may be highly
subjective, reflecting the trademark holder’s particular views about the
characteristics of its brands; the public may not necessarily share these
views. In the case of Braun (Oral-B brand toothbrushes) versus the
Bunny (toothbrush tip accessory), at least one business community
found Braun’s response to be financially insipid. Fortune Magazine
voted Procter and Gamble’s actions in this matter (sending a cease and
desist letter to the LoveHoney company) as one of the “101 Dumbest
96
Moments in Business.” One wonders whether its actions were “dumb”
because they fueled public interest in the controversy or because they
potentially foreclosed a lucrative market.
Either way, the
manufacturer’s subjective belief of harm leaves little room for consumer
sensibility or sense of humor.

brand internet search engine and associated services. An icon resembling a bottle of ink and
a pen represents the word processing program, “PAGES.”
95. See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through
Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1700 (2007) (“[I]f trademark law’s goal is to improve
the overall quality (not necessarily quantity) of information available to consumers, giving
trademark holders unfettered control over their marks will impede rather than promote that
objective. Trademark holders often have no incentive to inform consumers about compatible,
complementary, or competing products in which the consumers may well have an interest, or
about negative reviews or price comparisons featuring their own products.”). See also,
Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 91, at 1659 (Asserting “the need for attention to context has
only grown as trademarks have come to assume an even greater multitude of roles in
contemporary society . . . . A review of recent trademark cases shows that disputes frequently
involve a number of competing values and may require balancing of the gains of consumer
avoidance with the competing social gains of free speech or some other public good.”).
96. See supra note 2.

